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Abstract
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to
set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its plat-
form. To do so, we use a principal-agent approach, where the agents (the market makers) optimise
their quotes in a Nash equilibrium fashion, providing best response to the contract proposed by
the principal (the exchange). This contract aims at attracting liquidity on the platform. This is
because the wealth of the exchange depends on the arrival of market orders, which is driven by
the spread of market makers. We compute the optimal contract in quasi explicit form and also
derive the optimal spread policies for the market makers. Several new phenomena appears in this
multi market maker setting. In particular we show that it is not necessarily optimal to have a
large number of market makers in the presence of a contracting scheme.
Key words: Make take fees, market making, high-frequency trading, contract theory, financial
regulation, principal-agent problem, multi agents problem, stochastic control.
1 Introduction
Optimal market making has been a topic of interest in mathematical finance since the seminal work
[1]. Market makers are liquidity providers, who post limit orders on the bid and ask sides of the order
book of an underlying asset, available on an exchange. They buy and sell simultaneously, earning the
spread between their quotes and the mid-price, and have to dynamically manage their inventory, thus
skew their quotes depending on their position. First simple market making problems are addressed in
[1; 9], where the authors use a stochastic control approach. Later in [8], an explicit solution is provided
by imposing an inventory threshold for the market maker. A vast literature has emerged from these
articles, and various extensions have been studied, see for example [2; 7]. All these models deal with
the case of a market making activity with no maker taker fees policy from the exchange.
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Due to the fragmentation of financial markets, exchanges (Nasdaq, Euronext,. . . ) are in competition
and therefore need to find innovative ways to attract liquidity on their platforms. One of these ways
is the use of a maker taker fees system: the exchange typically associates a fee rebate to executed
limit orders, while charging a transaction cost for market orders. This enables it to subsidise liquidity
provision and tax liquidity consumption. The problem of a relevant make take fees policy is therefore
key for the quality of market liquidity and for the revenue of the corresponding exchange platform. In
[4], an optimal make take fees policy is derived, depending on the transaction flow generated by the
market maker.
However, either with or without the intervention of an exchange, no optimal market making framework
addresses the issue of several market makers competing with each other. Such consideration is of crucial
importance for several reasons. The case of a single market maker means that he has no competitor,
hence only needs to manage his inventory risk. However, for many financial assets, market making
activity is provided by several market makers (typically three to ten), see for example [15]. Therefore,
having a multi agents model suits better to the vast majority of markets. A single agent model may
overestimate the order flow that a market maker will process during the trading period. Moreover,
several important features of financial markets are linked to competition between market makers, such
as spread formation and order book shape, see [3; 6; 11; 13]. From the viewpoint of the exchange,
considering several market makers can be relevant since it has in practice access to information related
to the identity of the agents involved in each transaction. For those reasons, in the spirit of [4], we
extend the framework of make take fees problem to the case of an exchange (or of a regulator) wishing
to attract liquidity on a market, with several market makers trading on a single underlying asset.
From a modelling point of view, our paper follows the same inspiration as the literature mentioned
above. Here, we aim at studying the contracting problem of an exchange and several market makers
who trade on a single underlying asset. We place ourselves in a principal-agent framework similar
to [10]. The principal wants to build a contract for the agents, enabling him to define an optimal
make take fees policy, in order to maximise his revenue. Market takers send bid and ask orders, of
constant volume equal to one, whereas market makers control their quotes on the asset (no notion of
volume of limit orders is considered here). We base our contract on the transaction flow, as well as the
asset price. Note that, as in [4], the spread of the agents is not a contractible variable. It is indeed
preferable to only consider variables involved in actual transactions. Furthermore, the very definition
of individual spreads is ambiguous, as in practice market makers operates in a limit order book where
they post several orders with different volumes. The market orders are executed by the market maker
with the best quotes. However, other market participants receive a compensation depending on the
distance between their quotes and the best bid or ask. By doing so, we aim at modelling queue position
affecting the order book, see [6; 11; 14]. As we assume constant volume, this represents the fact that
an order may be splitted between agents depending on their position in the order book. Furthermore,
this compensation reflects the importance for market makers to get tight enough quotes for commercial
reasons, see Section 3 for details. Consequently, the PnL process of each market maker depend on the
quotes of the others. Finally, in the single market maker framework of [4], intensity of arrival orders
are a decreasing function of the agent’s spread. In our case, the intensity increases with total liquidity
on the market. To do so we represent the whole liquidity of the order book using a weighted sum of
the spreads depending on their distance with respect to an efficient price.
As in [4], our problem is addressed by solving a Stackelberg game between the exchange and the market
makers:
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(i) Following the approach in [5], each market maker computes his best–reaction function given
spreads from other agents, which provides a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Given this equilibrium, the exchange computes his optimal response (the optimal contract) by
solving the appropriate Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation.
(iii) This response is re–injected in the agents’ optimal quotes, which give the optimal answer of both
parties.
One can retrieve optimal quotes in a semi explicit form through a partial differential equation. More-
over, the optimal contract1 is expressed as a sum of stochastic integrals with respect to market order
and efficient price processes. We emphasize that such contracting scheme can be readily implemented
and is easily interpretable, see Section 3.3.
An important finding is that an increase of the number of market makers does not necessarily decrease
the average spread. It means that there is, for a given set of market parameters, an "optimal" number of
market makers in the sense of PnL maximisation for the platform. It therefore provides, for an exchange,
a framework to decide how many market participants they wish to attract in order to increase their
profit. We also provide a simple formula to choose the "taker cost", in the same spirit as in [4]. This
is discussed through Section 4.4. We emphasize the fact that, to our knowledge, we provide the first
paper using a framework à la Avellaneda and Stoïkov dealing with the multi market maker problem.
One of our main contribution from this paper lies in the possibility to analyse the impact of adding
market makers in a market on quantities of interest such as trading cost, total order flow, and PnL of
the platform. We also see that adding a market participant with a higher risk-aversion parameter will
decrease the average spread and conversely. Moreover, decreasing the taker cost when the number of
market makers increase leads to a higher PnL for the platform up to a certain point (see Section 4.4).
We organize the paper as follows: in Section 2, we introduce some preliminaries on stochastic calculus
for the main objects of the model. Then, we present the way we model the multi market maker case,
and the key differences with [4]. We also describe the market makers and the exchange’s optimisation
problem. In Section 3, we give the best reaction functions of each market makers for a given contract
and define the form of admissible contracts. In Section 4, we solve explicitly the exchange’s problem
and provide the form of the incentives given to each market maker. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss
the impact of the presence of several market makers on market liquidity and PnL of the platform.
Notations: Let N? be the set of all positive integers. For any (`, c) ∈ N?×N?,M`,c(R) will denote the
space of `×c matrices with real entries. Elements of the matrixM ∈M`,c are denoted (M i,j)1≤i≤`,1≤j≤c
and the transpose of M is denoted M>. We identify M`,1 with R`. When ` = c, we let M`(R) :=
M`,`(R). For any x ∈ M`,c(R), and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and 1 ≤ j ≤ c, xi,: ∈ M1,c(R), and x:,j ∈ R`
denote respectively the i−th row and the j−th column of M . Moreover, for any x ∈M`,c(R) and any
1 ≤ j ≤ c, x:,−j ∈ M`,c−1(R) denote the matrix x without the j−th column. For any x ∈ M`,c(R)
and y ∈ R`, we also define for i = 1, . . . , `, y ⊗i x ∈M`,c+1(R) as the matrix whose first i− 1 columns
are equal to the first i − 1 columns of x, such that for j = i + 1, . . . , c + 1, the j−th column is equal
to the (j − 1)−th column of x, and whose i−th column is equal to y. For any x ∈ R`, we also define
x := mini∈{1,...,`} xi. We also define 1N the vector of RN with every component equal to one.
1As would be done in most cases in practice, we impose that every market maker receives the same contract. This
means that it can not depend on individual risk aversion parameters.
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Throughout the paper, we fix a constant δ∞ > 0, which is assumed to be sufficiently large (how large
exactly will be made specific later on).
2 The model
2.1 Framework
2.1.1 Canonical process
As in [4], the framework considered throughout this paper is inspired by the seminal works [1] and [8]
where there is no exchange acting on the market. Let N ≥ 1 be an integer representing the number
of market makers in the market. We also define a positive constant δ∞, which is assumed to be large
enough, a statement that will be made precise later on. We consider a final horizon time T > 0,
and the space Ω =: Ωc × Ω2Nd , with Ωc the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] into R, and Ωd
the set of piecewise constant càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into N. We consider Ω as a subspace of
the Skorokhod space D([0, T ],R2N+1) of càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into R2N+1, and let F be the
trace Borel σ−algebra on Ω, where the topology is the one associated to the usual Skorokhod distance
on D([0, T ],R2N+1). We let (Xt)t∈[0,T ] :=
(
Wt, N
1,a
t , . . . , N
N,a
t , N
1,b
t , . . . , N
N,b
t
)
t∈[0,T ] be the canonical
process on Ω, that is to say
Wt(ω) := w(t), N i,at (ω) := ni,a(t), N i,bt (ω) := ni,b(t), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
with ω := (w, n1,a, . . . , nN,a, n1,b, . . . , nN,b) ∈ Ω. The following aggregated counting processes will also
be useful
N j :=
N∑
i=1
N i,j, j ∈ {a, b}.
Finally, define for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j ∈ {a, b} the maps λi,j : RN ×ZN −→ R and λ : RN ×ZN −→ R by
λi,j(x, q) := A exp
(
− k
σ
(
c+$
N∑
i=1
xi1{xi=x} +
N∑
i=1
K∑
`=1
H`x
i1{xi∈K`}1{xi 6=x}
))
1{xi=x,qi>−φ(j)q}∑N
`=1 1{x`=x,q`>−φ(j)q}
,
(2.1)
λj(x, q) :=
N∑
i=1
λi,j(x, q),
where A, k, σ, and c are fixed positive constants, K is a fixed positive integer, q ∈ N, $ and (H`)`=1,...,K
are real–valued and will be fixed later, and {K` : ` = 1, . . . , K} is an open covering of the interval
[0, δ∞]. Moreover
φ(j) :=
1, if j = a,−1, if j = b.
Remark 2.1. The maps λi,j are here to define the intensity of the point processes N i,j, whereas λ plays
this role for the aggregated point processes. It is a generalisation of the exponential intensity used in
[4; 8], in the sense that
• All spreads are taken into account, weighted with respect to their value;.
• When N = 1 and $ = 1, we recover the intensity for the single market maker case.
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2.1.2 Admissible controls, inventory process and canonical probability measure
We define the probability P0 on (Ω,F) such that under P0,W , N i,a, and N i,b are independent for all i =
1, . . . , N , W is a one–dimensional Brownian motion, N i,a and N i,b are Poisson processes with intensity
λi,a(0, 0), and λi,b(0, 0) respectively.23 We therefore endow the space (Ω,F) with the (P0−augmented)
canonical filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] := (F ct ⊗(Fdt )⊗d)t∈[0,T ] generated by (Xt)t∈[0,T ]. It is well–known that
the filtration F satisfies the usual conditions and the Blumenthal 0−1 law. All notions of measurability
for processes, unless otherwise stated, should be understood as being associated to F.
The market maker has a view on the efficient price (which should be understood as the mid–price) of
the asset given by (St)t∈[0,T ], defined as
St := S0 + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.2)
where S0 > 0 is the known initial value of the price, and σ > 0 is its volatility.
Next, we define the properties of the controlled processes of the agents. Based on their view on the
efficient price (2.2), market makers offer bid and ask quotes on the underlying asset. Such prices are
defined by
P i,bt := St − δi,bt , P i,at := St + δi,at , t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where the superscript b (resp. a) accounts for bid (respectively ask). The set of admissible controls for
the market makers is therefore defined as
A :=
{
(δt)t∈[0,T ] = (δi,at , δi,bt )i=1,...,Nt∈[0,T ] : R2N−valued and predictable processes bounded by δ∞
}
. (2.3)
The predictability of the spreads reflects the fact that each agent chooses in advance his quotes. The
boundedness assumption here is technical and simply helps us to define the associated probability
measures. As the optimal contract we will derive later on leads naturally to bounded spreads, this is
actually without loss of generality, provided the bounds are chosen large enough4.
A market maker manages both the spreads and his inventory process. For the i−th agent, a filled bid
order, represented by N i,b, increase its inventory by one unit, and conversely for an ask order. It leads
to the following definition of an inventory process of a market maker
Qit := N
i,b
t −N i,at , t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Remark 2.2. Given the form of the intensities (2.1), the i−th agent will see his inventory changing
only if he quotes a spread such that δi,b = δb, or δi,a = δa. Such quotations are called the best bid, and
best ask spread respectively.
The term q defined in (2.1) acts as a critical absolute inventory, which is the same for each agent.
Assume the i−th market maker cross this threshold on the bid side, then λi,b(δ, q) = 0 and he can only
receive ask orders to decrease his inventory below q.
2As a direct consequence, Na and N b are Poisson processes with intensity λ(0)
3In other words, P0 is simply the product measure of the Wiener measure on Ωc and the unique measure on Ω2Nd that
makes the canonical process there into an homogeneous Poisson process with the prescribed intensity.
4See Lemma A.5 for the prescribed value of δ∞.
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2.1.3 Change of probability measure
Given our technical assumptions, we introduce for any δ ∈ A a new probability measure Pδ on (Ω,F)
under which S follows (2.2) and
N˜ δ,i,at := N i,at −
∫ t
0
λi,a(δar , Qt)dr, N˜
δ,i,b
t := N i,bt −
∫ t
0
λi,b(δbr, Qt)dr, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (2.4)
are martingales. This probability measure is defined by the corresponding Doléans-Dade exponential
Lδt := exp
 N∑
i=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ t
0
log
(
λi,j(δjr , Qr)
A
)
dN i,jr −
∫ t
0
(
λi,j(δjr , Qr)− A
)
dr
, (2.5)
where Q := (Q1, . . . , QN)>. By direct application of Ito¯’s formula, and the uniform boundedness of δa,
and δb, this local martingale satisfies the Novikov–type criterion given in [18], and thus is a martingale.
Remark 2.3. By definition, the compensated aggregated point processes
N˜ δ,at := Nat −
∫ t
0
λ(δar )dr, N˜
δ,b
t := N bt −
∫ t
0
λ(δbr)dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
are also martingales under Pδ.
We can therefore define the Girsanov change of measure with dPδdP0 = L
δ
T (see for instance [12, Theorem
III.3.1]). In particular, all the probability measures Pδ indexed by δ ∈ A are equivalent. The notation
a.s., for almost surely, can be used without ambiguity. Throughout the paper, we write Eδt for the
conditional expectation with respect to Ft under the probability measure Pδ.
Hence, the arrival of ask (resp. bid) market orders for the i−th market maker is represented by the
point process (N i,at )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (N i,bt )t∈[0,T ]) of intensity (λi,a(δat )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (λi,b(δat )t∈[0,T ]) and the
total arrival of ask (resp. bid) market orders is represented by the point process (Nat )t∈[0,T ] (resp.
(N bt )t∈[0,T ]) of intensity (λ(δat )t∈[0,T ] (resp. (λ(δbt )t∈[0,T ]).
2.1.4 Interpretations
First, we clarify the form of the maps in (2.1). The intensity of buy (resp. sell) market order arrivals
depends on the extra cost of each trade paid by the market taker compared to the efficient price.
This extra cost is the sum of the spread δb (resp. δa) imposed by the market maker who is currently
trading at the best bid (resp. best ask), and the transaction cost c > 0 collected by the exchange.
Moreover, following classical financial economics results, the average number of trades per unit of time
is a decreasing function of the ratio between the spread and the volatility (see [3], [13], and [19]).
The intensity of arrival orders depends also on the market liquidity, namely the spread quoted by
all market participants. Hence, the spread of the i−th market maker is weighted by a constant H`,
` ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Such constant will be chosen later on. For the moment, note that it is a decreasing
function of `. Hence, a small spread corresponds to a high weight and conversely. Recall that in our
model, we make the approximation that we can only have orders of size 1. Hence, an increase of the
intensity represents the fact that we can send bigger orders (many orders of size 1 corresponds to one
large order).
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Such weights depends on the open covering
{
K` : ` ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
, introduced in Subsection 2.1.1.
Several forms can be chosen (thinner intervals around the first Tick for instance), and throughout this
paper we use the following definition
K` :=
(
(`− 1)Tick,min(`Tick, δ∞)
)
, ` ∈ {1, . . . , K}. (2.6)
We will see that at the optimum, the covering has no impact on the PnL of both principal and agents,
due to the form of both PnL process and intensity.
Remark 2.4. Equation (2.6) indicates that the open covering is not a dynamic function of the vector of
spreads. Hence, we add the indicator function 1{xi 6=x} to ensure that the coordinate x is not associated
to a weight $ + H`, for ` ∈ {1, . . . , K}, but only to $. In addition to this, fixing the open covering
makes the model more tractable from a numerical point of view. Otherwise, at each time–step, the
corresponding areas should be computed again.
2.2 Market makers’ problem
2.2.1 PnL process of the agents
First, we define the PnL process of the i−th market maker when the market makers play δ ∈ A as
PLδ,it :=
∫ t
0
∑
j∈{a,b}
(
δi,js 1{δi,js =δjs} +
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,j
s 1{δi,js ∈K`}
)
dN js +
∫ t
0
QisdSs, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.7)
The first integral corresponds to the cash flow process, whereas the other represents the inventory risk
process of the i−th agent, and ω` ∈ (0, 1), ` ∈ {1, . . . , K} are weights that decrease toward zero as `
increases. The market maker is remunerated with an increasing fraction of his quote when he is near
from the best spread. Such remuneration decreases as the spread quoted moves away from the best
spread. This is an incentive for the agents to quote a lower spread in general, and represents the fact
that an order may be splitted between agents depending on their position in the order book.
Such form of incentive is particularly well suited to certain markets where there are hundreds of market
makers, and a selection of market participants has to be done by the platform. Such selection is required
by some clients, who ask for a specific number of market maker to ensure competition on the exchange.
Moreover, good position on external rankings attracts new clients on the platform. To do so, a selection
criteria is the price quality provided by market makers.
Moreover, we assume no partial execution for the agents. Hence, if two market makers are playing the
best spread, they are both fully executed, in the sense that they receive the whole trade.
Remark 2.5. Whereas the market maker is remunerated with a portion of his spread when trading in
a certain area compared to the best bid–ask, it is not reflected in hid inventory process. Indeed, the
terms ω`δi,j accounts only for the cash process: the market maker’s inventory does not move if he does
not quote at the best bid–ask.
2.2.2 Best reaction functions
Equation (2.7) represents the PnL of an agent in the absence of contract from the exchange. Following
the principal–agent approach, the exchange proposes a remuneration ξi defined by an FT−measurable
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random variable to each market maker, in addition to their PnL process. These aim at creating an
incentive to attract liquidity on the platform by reducing the market makers’ spreads. We will prove
a certain representation theorem for the set of admissible contracts.
Given their contracts, the agents are facing a stochastic differential game, since the relative rankings of
their spreads directly impact whether their orders are executed or not. Since we will later be looking for
Nash equilibria for this game, we consider that the optimisation problem of the i−th market maker is
a function of the spread vector δ−i quoted by the N − 1 other agents. Hence, each agent will maximise
his PnL given actions of the other market makers to obtain his so–called best–reaction function. By
denoting γi > 0 the risk–aversion of the i−th market maker, and using a CARA utility function
Ui(x) := −e−γix, x ∈ R, we are left with the following maximisation problem
V iMM(ξi, δ−i) := sup
δi∈Ai(δ−i)
EPδ⊗iδ
−i
Ui
ξi+∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ T
0
δi,jt
(
1{δi,jt =δjt⊗iδj,−it }+
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`1{δi,jt ∈K`}
)
dN jt +
∫ T
0
QitdSt
,
where Ai(δ−i) := {δ : δ ⊗i δ−i ∈ A}.
To ensure that this quantity is not degenerate, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we assume that for all δ ∈ A
Eδ
[
exp
(
− γ′ξi
)]
< +∞, for some γ′ > max(γ1, . . . , γN). (2.8)
We call RN−valued FT−measurable random variables ξ satisfying (2.8) contracts. The integrability
condition ensures that the market maker’s problem is well–defined (that is the sup remains finite).
As the N market makers play simultaneously, we are looking for a Nash equilibrium resulting of the
interactions between agents. We now provide the appropriate definition of such an equilibrium
2.2.3 Nash equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a set of admissible controls such that each market maker has no interest in
deviating from its current position, given a contract offered by the principal. It is formalised with the
following definition.
Definition 2.6. For a given contract ξ, a Nash equilibrium for the N agents is a set of actions δˆ(ξ) ∈ A
such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
V iMM(ξi, δˆ−i(ξ))=EP
δˆ(ξ)
[
Ui
(
ξi+
∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ T
0
δˆi,jt (ξ)
(
1{δˆi,jt (ξ)=δˆjt (ξ)}+
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`1{δˆi,jt (ξ)∈K`}
)
dN jt +
∫ T
0
QitdSt
)]
.
(2.9)
We introduce for any contract ξ the set NA(ξ) of all associated Nash equilibria. This set is of particular
importance as it will be imposed to be non–empty, to ensure the existence of, at least, one Nash
equilibrium. We now turn to the exchange’s contracting problem.
2.3 The exchange optimal contracting problem
In our framework, the exchange is compensated by a fixed amount c > 0 for each market order that
occurs in the market. As in [4], since we are anyway working on a short time interval, we take c
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independent of the price of the asset. The goal of the exchange is to maximise the total number of
aggregated market orders NaT + N bT arriving during the time interval [0, T ]. As the arrival intensities
are only controlled by the market makers, the contract vector ξ aim at increasing these intensities,
which are decreasing functions of the spreads. Hence, the exchange will pay to each market maker this
contract at time T and the form of his PnL, using a CARA utility function, is given by
− exp
(
− η
(
c(NaT +N bT )− ξ · 1N
))
,
where η > 0 denote the risk aversion parameter of the principal.
We now provide a suitable definition of the set of admissible contracts offered by the exchange. First,
we need to ensure that the problem of the exchange does not degenerate. Hence, we assume that, for
all δ ∈ A
Eδ
[
exp
(
η′ξ · 1N
)]
< +∞, for some η′ > η. (2.10)
Since Na and N b are point processes with bounded intensities, this condition, together with Hölder’s
inequality, ensure that the problem of the exchange is well–defined.5 We also assume that the market
makers only accept contracts ξi such that their maximal utility V iMM(ξi, δˆ−i), taken at a Nash equilib-
rium δˆ ∈ NA(ξ), is above a threshold value Ri < 0. This value is known as the reservation utility of
the i−th agent, and leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.7. The set of admissible contracts C is defined as the set of RN−valued, FT−measurable
random variables ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξN)>, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (2.8) and (2.10) hold, and the
participation constraints of all agents are satisfied for at least one Nash equilibrium in NA(ξ) (which
is then automatically non–empty).
In the set of admissible contracts, the participation constraints of the agents are satisfied for at least one
Nash equilibrium generated by ξ. As we anticipate that the participation constraints will be binding
for any optimal contract ξ, the agents are indifferent between the possible different Nash equilibria
generated by ξ. This means that we can use the same convention as the one used in the classical
principal–agent literature, where the principal has enough bargaining power to impose to the agents
which equilibrium he wants them to use. His optimisation problem is thus written as
V E0 := sup
ξ∈C
sup
δˆ∈NA(ξ)
Eδˆ(ξ)
[
− exp
(
− η
(
c(NaT +N bT )− ξ · 1N
))]
. (2.11)
Now that we have properly defined the two problems of the Stackelberg game, we can move towards
the resolution of the market maker’s problem. Before solving this two–steps problem, we first sketch
the approach we undertake.
2.4 Stackelberg games in a nutshell
Each market maker has an optimisation problem which depends on the control processes of the N − 1
others agents, and on the contract given by the principal. Hence, solving the i−th agent’s problem is
done by searching the best reaction functions of each market makers, given a set of actions δ−i of the
5We will see in the verification Theorem 4.4 that such a condition is required for a uniform integrability type argument
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other agents. Hence, the spreads quoted by every agent will both depend on the incentives given by
the principal, and the spreads of opponents.
As stated before, the market makers fix their quotes simultaneously, so they must agree on an equi-
librium between their reaction functions. To solve this problem, we will make use of an equivalent
definition of a Nash equilibrium, given in [5] and recalled in the next section. In particular, there is a
direct link between the existence of a Nash equilibrium and a solution to a multidimensional system of
BSDEs.
The key point is that, for a specific choice of weights H` in (2.1), the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium is direct, because of two important facts. First, the use of indicator functions 1{δi,j=δj}, and
1{δi,j 6=δj} acts as a decoupling effect on the agents’ Hamiltonian. Second, such effect can be achieved
only in the case of a restriction to a specific form of contracts. This restriction will be explained and
commented in Section 3. For the moment, note that it enables to compute explicitly a unique Nash
equilibrium for the market maker’s problem.
Given that admissible contracts generate at least one Nash equilibrium, the principal solve his optimi-
sation problem by choosing the incentives given to each market maker, as a result of its associated HJB
equation. This provides explicitly the optimal quotes of the agents, and solve the two steps Stackelberg
game.
3 Solving the market maker’s problem
We start by solving the problem of the i−th market maker facing an arbitrary admissible contract
proposed by the exchange. This section is mainly devoted to Theorem 3.7. First, we introduce a
certain form of contracts proposed by the principal to the i−th agent. This FT−measurable random
variable takes the form of the terminal condition to a specific BSDE, although we do not use this theory
to solve the problem. We then prove that this is the only form of contracts that can be proposed to the
market makers. Then, given this specific form, we derive the optimal response of each agents, other
actions being fixed.
3.1 Preliminaries
For notational simplicity, let us define R := RN × RN × R, B∞ := [−δ∞, δ∞].
Definition 3.1. Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For any (di, d−i, zi, q) ∈ B2∞ ×B2(N−1)∞ ×R×ZN , where we
have zi :=
(
(zi,j,a)j=1,...,N , (zi,j,b)j=1,...,N , zS,i
)
, and di := (di,a, di,b), the Hamiltonian of the i−th agent is
defined by
H i(d−i, zi, q) := sup
di∈B2∞
hi(di, d−i, zi, q), (3.1)
where
hi(di, d−i, zi, q) :=
N∑
`=1
∑
j∈{a,b}
γ−1i
(
1−exp
(
−γi
(
zi,`,j+di,j1{di,j=dj⊗idj,−i}+
K∑
k=1
ωkd
i,j1{di,j∈Kk}
)))
λ`,j(dj, q).
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As in every stochastic control problem, such quantity is of particular importance. It is naturally
derived from an application of Ito¯’s formula to e−γiYt , for i = 1, . . . , N where Y is defined by (3.3).
Then, maximising this quantity will give the optimal spreads quoted by the i−th market maker, given
the spreads quoted by the other agents.
The form of the maps (hi)i=1,...,N requires that a maximiser in (3.1) is a function of d−i, zi, and q. This
suggests a proper definition of a fixed point of the Hamiltonian vector
(
H i(d−i, zi, q)
)
i=1,...,N
.
Definition 3.2. For every (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN a fixed point of the Hamiltonian is defined by a matrix
δ?(z, q) ∈MN,2(R) such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
δ?i(z, q) ∈ argmax
δi∈B2∞
hi(δi, δ?−i, zi, q). (3.2)
For every (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN , we denote by O(z, q) the set of all fixed points.
We need the following standing technical assumption.
Assumption 3.3. There exists at least one Borel–measurable map δ? : RN × ZN −→ MN,2(R) such
that for every (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN , δ?(z, q) ∈ O(z, q). The corresponding set of maps is denoted by O.
Remark 3.4. We will see that in the specific case where zi,j,a = zi,a, and zi,j,b = zi,b for all (i, j) ∈
{1, . . . , N}2, there exists a unique fixed point in O(z, q) for any (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN . This specification
is used in Corollary 3.9, where the Nash equilibrium is provided explicitly.
We now define a family of processes which represents the form of contract given to the agents.
Definition 3.5. Given y0 ∈ RN, and R−valued predictable process Zi := (Zi,j,a, Zi,j,b, ZS,i)j=1,...,N ,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we introduce the family of RN−valued processes (Y y0,Z,δˆ)δˆ∈O indexed by fixed point
maps δˆ ∈ O, whose i−th coordinate is given by, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and t ∈ [0, T ]
Y i,y0,Z,δˆt :=yi0+
N∑
j=1
∫ t
0
Zi,j,ar dN j,ar +Zi,j,br dN j,br +ZS,ir dSr+
(
γiσ
2
2 (Z
S,i
r +Qir)2−H i
(
δˆ−i(Zr, Qr), Zir, Qr
))
dr.
(3.3)
We say that Z := (Zi)i=1,...,N belongs to the set Z, if Y y0,Z,δˆT satisfies (2.8) and (2.10).
This condition ensures that the market maker’s problem is not degenerated given this specific form of
contract. Moreover, given the integrability conditions on the coefficients, the processes
(
Y y0,Z,δˆ
)
δˆ∈O
are well defined and
(
e−γiY i
)
is a uniformly integrable process under Pδ, for every δ ∈ A, and i ∈
{1, . . . , N}.6 To link an admissible vector contract ξ ∈ C to the processes defined in (3.3), we define
the following set.
Definition 3.6. We define Ξ as the set of random variables Y y0,Z,δˆT where (y0, Z, δˆ) ranges in RN×Z×O,
and such that e−γiyi0 ≥ Ri for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.7
Since by definition all bounded predictable processes are contained in Z, it is clearly nonempty.
To prove equality of these sets, we are reduced to the problem of representing any contract ξi as Y i,y0,Z,δˆT
for some (y0, Z) ∈ RN × Z and some δˆ ∈ O. Following the approach of [17], we derive a dynamic
programming principle for the utility function of the market maker, and then prove the equality of the
sets by identification of the coefficients.
6Such condition is used to provide explicitly the best response of the agents in Corollary 3.9.
7Theorem 3.7 proves that such contract generates at least one equilibrium.
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3.2 Contract representation
The following theorem provides solution to the market maker’s problem, and a complete characterisa-
tion of the set of admissible contracts.
Theorem 3.7. Any contract vector ξ = Y y0,Z,δˆT with (y0, Z, δˆ) ∈ RN × Z × O leads to a unique Nash
equilibrium for the agents, given by
(
δˆ(Zt, Qt)
)
t∈[0,T ].
Conversely, any admissible contract ξ ∈ C is of the form ξ = Y y0,Z,δˆT for some (y0, Z) ∈ RN ×Z and a
certain δˆ ∈ O.
In the next corollary, we restrict ourselves to a subset of admissible contracts under which each agent
earn his reservation utility and where we can derive explicitly their best–response. For such purpose,
we introduce the following set
Ξ′ :=
{
Y y0,Z,δˆT : (δˆ, y0, Z)∈O×RN×Z, s.t. for all (i, j, k)∈{1, . . . , N}2×{a, b}, e−γiy
i
0≥Ri, Zi,j,k=:Zi,k
}
.
The main interest of the subset Ξ′ is the following result.
Lemma 3.8. Assume that, for (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN , we have zi,`,j = zi,j for all (i, `) ∈ {1, . . . , N}2 and
j ∈ {a, b}. We define
Γi,j(z) := −zi,j + 1
γi
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
, z ∈ RN .
We also introduce the function ∆ : RN × ZN −→ MN,2(R) defined by, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j ∈ {a, b},
(z, q) ∈ RN × ZN
∆i,j(z, q) :=

(−δ∞) ∨ Γi,j(z) ∧ δ∞, if Γi,j(z) < Γ`,j(z), −q < q < q, for all ` 6= i,
(−δ∞) ∨ 1
ω`
Γi,j(z) ∧ δ∞, if 1
ω`
Γi,j(z) ∈ K`, −q < q < q, for ` ∈ {1, . . . , K},
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
Then, O(z, q) is reduced to the singleton
{
∆(z, q)
}
.
The proof is reported in the appendix, and follows from standard computations on the Hamiltonian
(3.1). In particular, it leads to existence and uniqueness of the maximiser of (3.1). We can now
conclude with the announced corollary.
Corollary 3.9. For any admissible contract Y y0,Z,δˆT ∈ Ξ′ offered by the principal, there exist a unique
Nash equilibrium, given by by
(
∆(Zt, Qt)
)
t∈[0,T ], where the map ∆ is defined in (3.4).
This result states that, at the optimum, the utility function of each market maker corresponds to its
reservation utility, that is to say the quantity such that the N agents accept their contract. Moreover,
it enables us to characterise explicitly a unique Nash equilibrium for the market maker’s problem. We
end the section with some comments on the shape of admissible contracts (3.5).
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3.3 On the shape of compensation proposed and contractible variables.
In this section, we would like to highlight some interpretation on the classes Ξ and Ξ′ of "smooth"
contracts ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN)> controlled by (y0, Z, δˆ) ∈ RN ×Z ×O and having the form
ξi = yi0 +
N∑
j=1
∫ T
0
Zi,j,ar dN j,ar +Zi,j,br dN j,br +ZS,ir dSr +
(
1
2γiσ
2(ZS,ir +Qir)2 −H i
(
δˆ−i(Zr, Qr), Zir, Qr
))
dr.
• The compensation yi0 is calibrated by the exchange to ensure the reservation utility constraint with
level Ri of the i−th market maker, we refer to Section 4 for more details on it.
• The term ∫ T0 ZS,ir dSr is the compensation given to the market maker with respect to the efficient
price.
• The terms ∫ T0 Zi,j,ar dN j,ar , and ∫ T0 Zi,j,br dN j,br are the compensation of the i−th market maker with
respect to the number of trades made on the ask side or bid side by the j-th market maker.
• The term ∫ T0 H i(δˆ−i(Zr, Qr), Zir, Qr)dr is the certain gain of the i−th agent induced by his max-
imisation problem. The principal anticipates that the agent will earn money coming from his
maximisation strategy. Hence, he deducts such corresponding amount to the salary of the agent.
This justifies why this term appears with a minus sign in the compensation ξi.
• The term ∫ T0 12γiσ2(ZS,ir +Qir)2dr is the compensation8 to balance the risk aversion of the agent with
respect to the efficient price and his inventory.
From a representation viewpoint, the subset Ξ′ means that we index the contract of the i−th market
maker only on the aggregated order processes Na and N b, and the efficient price S. Practically, the
incentives for the i−th agent are only functions of his own inventory process, the aggregated order flow,
and the efficient price. This assumption appears reasonable from a practical point of view, as it means
that the platform does not need to monitor cross incentives Zi,j,a or Zi,j,b for j 6= i, which is hard to
do in practice. Moreover, from the technical point of view, there is no explicit formula for the fixed
points of the Hamiltonian in the general case. We will also see in the next section that this restriction
drastically simplify computations for the principal’s problem.
4 Solving the principal’s problem
Denote for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, yˆi0 := − 1γi log(−Ri). By Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 3.9, the exchange
problem (2.11), when restricted to contracts in Ξ′, reduces to the control problem
V˜ E0 := sup
y0≥yˆ0
sup
Z∈Z
E∆(Z,Q)
[
− exp
(
− η
(
c(NaT +N bT )− Y y0,Z,∆(Z,Q)T · 1N
))]
. (4.1)
Corollary 3.9 provides the best responses of the agents as a function of the control process Z ∈ Z of
the principal.9 Given such response, the exchange solve (2.11), with ξ ∈ Ξ′ , in two steps
8It corresponds to the quadratic variation of the sum of the incentive indexed on S and the inventory process of the
i-th market maker, integrated against S and weighted by its risk aversion.
9In this section δˆ is the unique Nash equilibrium of the agent’s problem coming from Corollary 3.9.
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• Due to the form of utility function, the optimisation with respect to y0 ensures the reservation
utility constraint of the agents is satisfied.
• Optimisation with respect to Z ∈ Z is done by solving a classical Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
equation associated to the reformulated control problem.
The section ends with a verification argument to ensure that the value function coincides with (2.11),
and some comments on switching policy between market makers and physical interpretation of the
results.
4.1 Saturation of utility constraint
Note that the market makers’ optimal response in Corollary 3.9 does not depend on y0. The exponential
linear framework for the PnL of the principal enables to state directly that this objective function is
clearly decreasing in all coordinates of y0, implying that the maximisation under the participation
constraint is achieved at yˆ0
V˜ E0 = eηyˆ0·1N sup
Z∈Z
E∆(Z,Q)
[
− exp
(
− η
(
c(NaT +N bT )− Y y0,Z,∆(Z,Q)T · 1N
))]
.
Hence, we are left with a maximisation problem with respect to Z ∈ Z, which is nothing else than a
standard stochastic control problem with the state variables Q, Na, N b and Y y0,Z,∆(Z,Q). Before moving
on to the resolution of the associated HJB equation, we make an additional assumption on the form
of the contracts.
Assumption 4.1. We search the optimal contracts in the set
Ξ′′ :=
{
Y
yˆ0,Z,∆(Z,Q)
T ∈ Ξ′ : Zi,a =: Za, Zi,b =: Zb for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
}
, (4.2)
where ∆(Z,Q) is the unique Nash equilibrium defined in Corollary 3.9.
In other words, we restrict ourselves to a subset of the admissible contracts where the incentives with
respect to the bid and ask arrival orders are equal for every agent. Hence, we do not discriminate a
priori one market maker compared to another. However, the discrimination is done in the market risk
part, namely
∫ T
0 Z
S,i
t dSt, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This assumption is in force until the end of the paper
(except in the appendix).
Such an assumption has a natural interpretation: the exchange give the same incentives to the agents
on the part driven by the market orders sent by market takers, but can discriminate with respect to the
risk aversion parameters on the part driven by the efficient price around which market makers adjust
their quotes. From a mathematical point of view, such a choice enables to derive explicitly the optimal
incentives that the principal provides to each market makers.
4.2 The HJB equation for the reduced exchange problem
We study in this section the HJB equation corresponding to the stochastic control problem
vE0 := sup
Z∈Z
E∆(Z,Q)
[
− exp
(
− η
(
c(NaT +N bT )− Y y0,Z,∆(Z,Q)T · 1N
))]
. (4.3)
14
For the sake of simplicity, we define for any map v : [0, T ] × ZN −→ (−∞, 0), any x ∈ R, any
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and any (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× ZN
v(t, q ⊕i x) := v(t, q1, . . . , qi−1, qi+x, qi+1, . . . , qN), v(t, q 	i x) := v(t, q1, . . . , qi−1, qi−x, qi+1, . . . , qN).
We also define the maps V+(t, q) :=
(
v(t, q ⊕i 1)
)
i=1,...,N
, and V−(t, q) :=
(
v(t, q 	i 1)
)
i=1,...,N
, for
(t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× ZN , as well as the set Q := {−q, . . . , q}. The HJB equation associated to (4.3) is
∂tv(t, q) +H
(
q,V+(t, q),V−(t, q), v(t, q)
)
= 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T )×QN ,
v(T, q) = −1, q ∈ QN ,
(4.4)
where H
(
q, p,m, v
)
:= HS
(
q, v)
)
+Hb
(
q, p, v
)
+Ha
(
q,m, v
)
, with, for any (q, p, `) ∈ QN ×RN ×{a, b}
HS
(
q, v)
)
= sup
zS∈RN
v
(
N∑
i=1
η
2σ
2γi
(
zS,i + qi
)2
+ η
2σ2
2 ‖z
S‖2
)
,
H`
(
q, p, v
)
= sup
z`∈R
N∑
i=1
λi,`
(
∆:,`(z, q), q
)(
eη(Nz`−c)pi − vL`
(
∆(z, q)
))
,
where
L`
(
∆(z, q)
)
:=1+η
N∑
i=1
γ−1i
(
1−exp
(
−γi
(
z+∆i,`(z, q)1{∆i,`(z,q)=∆i(z,q)}+
K∑
j=1
ωj∆i,`(z, q)1{∆i,`(z,q)∈Kj}
)))
.
We now provide the optimal incentives corresponding to the solution of (4.4).
Lemma 4.2. Assume δ∞ is large enough so that the condition of Lemma A.5 is verified. The optimisers
in the supremum appearing in PDE (4.4) are given, for any (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]×QN , by
z?,a(t, q) := 1
N
c+ 1
η
log
(
v(t, q)∑
i∈G v(t, q 	i 1)
)
+ 1
η
log
(
k$
k$ + σηCard(G)
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
)),
z?b(t, q) := 1
N
c+ 1
η
log
(
v(t, q)∑
i∈G v(t, q ⊕i 1)
)
+ 1
η
log
(
k$
k$ + σηCard(G)
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
)),
z?,S,i(q) := −
N∑
j=1
µi,jγjq
j, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , N}2
µi,j := −ηκ
∏
k∈{1,...,N}\{i,j}
γk, if i 6= j, µi,i := κ
 ∏
j∈{1,...,N}\{i}
γj + η
∑
j∈{1,...,N}\{i}
∏
k∈{1,...,N}\{i,j}
γk
,
with
κ−1 :=
N∏
i=1
γi + η
N∑
j=1
∏
k∈{1,...,N}\{j}
γk, and G :=
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : γi = max
j∈{1,...,N}
γj
}
.
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The optimisers z?,a and , z?,b are only functions of time and the inventory of the agents. Moreover,
they are very similar to the optimal incentives z?,a, and z?,b for the single market maker case in [4].
However, the dependence on the number of market makers and their risk aversion is represented by
the term
1
η
log
(
k$
k$ + σηCard(G)
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
))
.
It is an increasing function of N and $, which implies that when we increase the number of market
makers and $, this term decrease the average spread.
Notice also that the optimal z?,S depends on a weighted combination of all risk aversions and inventory
processes of the agents. This is discussed more in Section 5, where we also present our numerical
results.
4.3 Change of variable and verification theorem
Substituting the optima given by Lemma 4.2, PDE (4.4) boils down to
∂tv(t, q)+v(t, q)CS(q)− v(t, q)C
∑
j∈{a,b}
(
v(t, q)∑
i∈G v(t, q 	i φ(j))1{φ(j)qi>−q}
) k$
ση
= 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T )×QN ,
v(T, q) = −1, q ∈ QN ,
(4.5)
where we defined
C := A exp
(
− k
σ
(
c
(
1−$
)
− $
η
log
(
k$
k$ + ησCard
(
G
)(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
))
+$
N∑
i=1
γ−1i log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)))
ση
k$ + ση
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
)
,
CS(q) :=
N∑
i=1
η
2σ
2γi
(
qi −
N∑
i=1
µi,jγjq
j
)2
+ η
2σ2
2
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
µi,jγjq
j
)2
.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a unique bounded solution to (4.5), which is also negative.
The solution of (4.5) will be linked to the value function (4.3) using a verification argument in the next
section. Note that, if the agents have different risk aversion parameters, one market maker is both best
bid and best ask. Indeed, when a market maker is simultaneously the single best bid and best ask at
some time t ∈ [0, T ), the HJB equation reduces to the following linear PDE
0 = ∂tu− u(t, q)C˜S(q) + C˜u(t, q ⊕i 1)1{qi<q} + C˜u(t, q 	i 1)1{qi>−q},
where u := (−v)− k$ση , C˜S(q) := (k$)/(ση)CS(q), and C˜ := (k$)/(ση)C. As the other inventories are
fixed when the i−th market maker is quoting, we obtain a tridiagonal matrix similar to the one in [4],
indexed by qi ∈ Q. We emphasize that such form is valid only at the fixed time t.
We conclude with the following verification theorem, which leads to the description of a unique optimal
contract to be proposed by the exchange to each market maker.
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Theorem 4.4. Assume that δ∞ ≥ ∆∞, as defined in Lemma A.5, and let v be the unique solution to
(4.5) given by Lemma 4.3. Then, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the optimal contract for the i−th agent is
given by
ξ?,i := yˆi0 +
∫ T
0
Z?,ar dNar + Z?,br dN br + Z?,S,ir dSr +
(
1
2σ
2γi(Z?,S,ir +Qir)2 −H i
(
∆(Z?r , Qr), Z?r , Qr
))
dr,
(4.6)
where for any r ∈ [0, T ], Z?,Sr := z?,S(r,Qr−), Z?,ar := z∗a(r,Qr−), Z?,br = z?,b(r,Qr−), and we note Z?r :=(
Z?,ar , Z
?,b
r , Z
?,S
r
)
. Moreover, the optimal equilibrium is given by
(
∆(Z?r , Qr)
)
r∈[0,T ], see Corollary 3.9.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Switching policy
We want to determine which market maker is the best one at the beginning of the trading period. For
any (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , N}2 such that i 6= j, the i−th market maker has the best ask quotation at time
t ∈ [0, T ] if and only if
− Z?,at +
1
γi
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
< −Z?,at +
1
γj
log
(
1 + σγj
k$
)
.
Since the term 1
γi
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
is a decreasing function of γi, we conclude that the i−th market maker
trades first if and only if γi = maxj∈{1,...,N} γj, and we have(
v(t, Qt)∑
j∈G v(t, Qt 	j 1)
) k$
ση
=
(
v(t, Qt)
v(t, Qt 	i 1)
) k$
ση
.
We now define when there is a switching between two agents on the ask side. The N − 1 other marker
makers (recall that j 6= i) will place their quotes among the open covering of [0, δ∞]. Assume that
∆i,a(Z?t , Qt) ∈ Ku, for some u ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then
∆i,a(Z?t , Qt) > ∆j,a(Z?t , Qt)⇐⇒ −Z?,at +
1
γi
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
>
1
ωu
(
− Z?,at +
1
γj
log
(
1 + σγj
k$
))
, (4.7)
which can be rewritten as
log
(
u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− 	i 1)
)
>
k$
σ
(
log
(
k$
k$ + ση
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
))
+ c
)
+ kN$ωu(ωu − 1)σγi log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
+ kN$
σγj(ωu − 1)log
(
1 + σγj
k$
)
.
The right–hand side of the inequality is an increasing function of $ and a decreasing function of ωu and
the volatility σ. These results are completely symmetric for the bid side. Following, [4] the previous
equations shows that there is a switching between market makers on the ask side when the i-th market
maker holds a sufficiently negative inventory. This is because he is willing to attract bid order to mean
revert his inventory towards zero. Hence, he proposes a lower spread on the bid side, and a higher
spread on the ask side to discourage ask orders. Symmetric conclusion holds for the bid side.
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4.4.2 On the choice of the weights
Numerical experiments show, when N −→ +∞, a decrease of the intensity of the market orders, and
a slight increase of the average bid–ask spread, other parameters being fixed. However, an increase
of $ decrease the average best bid–ask spread, as well as the PnL of the platform, increase the total
order flow and decrease the trading cost. Recall that there is a trade–off between an increase of the
order flow, and the amount of incentive given to the market participants. Moreover, increasing the
competition between market makers leads to an increase of their reservation utility, which is costly
for the principal. Recall that we designed the aggregated intensity to be a decreasing function of a
weighted sum of the spreads quoted by the agents. In practice, the intensity of arrival orders mainly
depends on the best quote δ, that is to say for j ∈ {a, b}, and t ∈ [0, T )
λj(δ:,jt , Qt) = A exp
(
− k
σ
(
c+$
N∑
i=1
δi,jt 1{δi,jt =δjt} +
N∑
i=1
K∑
`=1
H`δ
i,j
t 1{δi,jt ∈K`}
))
≈ A exp
(
− k
σ
(
c+ δjt
))
.
Assume that G = {i}, $ = 1
N
. The optimal quotes in Theorem 4.4 become, for j ∈ {a, b}
∆j(Z?t,Qt)=
σ
k
log
(
u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− 	i φ(j))
)
+ 1
γi
log
(
1+σγiN
k
)
− 1
N
(
c+ 1
η
log
(
k
k + σηN
(
1+ησ
N∑
i=1
N
k + σγiN
)))
.
Hence, when the number of market maker increases, the last term corresponding to the incentive given
by the principal vanish to zero and we are left with, for j ∈ {a, b}
∆j(Z?t , Qt) ≈
σ
k
log
(
u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− 	i φ(j))
)
+ 1
γi
log
(
1 + σγiN
k
)
.
It therefore converges toward the form of spread given when there is no contract, but with a different
value function.
4.4.3 On the form of the incentives
The quantities z?,j, j ∈ {a, b}, defined in Lemma 4.2, are decreasing function of the number of market
makers. Hence, the principal is limited in the amount of incentives he can provide to the agents. This
can be viewed as a cake whose size increase slower than the number of people who eats it. Hence, each
market maker receive less incentive to decrease their spread in our case of a uniform incentive and an
increasing number of market makers.
About the risk aversion of the additional market makers, adding a player with a small risk aversion
increase the quantity z?,j, j ∈ {a, b}. This means that adding a less risk adverse player increase the
capacity of the principal to offer incentive to reduce the average spread and conversely.
We have found processes Z?,a, Z?,b, Z?,S fixed by the principal in order to build optimal contracts for
every market makers. The assumption that the exchange chooses a priori the same incentives on the
arrival orders for each market maker is quite natural, since in practice the principal may not know the
risk aversions of each market maker. When a market maker is simultaneously best bid and best ask,
we recover the result from [4, Proposition 4.1], that the terms −log
(
u(t,Qt− )
u(t,Qt−	i1)
)
and −log
(
u(t,Qt− )
u(t,Qt−⊕i1)
)
are roughly proportional to, respectively, Qit− and −Qit− . The interpretation is the same: the exchange
provides incentives to the market makers to keep their inventory not too large.
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An interesting difference comes from the integrals
∫ T
0 Z
?,S,i
r dSr . As in [4], it is still understood as a risk
sharing term. However, each of the Z?,S,i is a weighted function of both γi and the other risk aversions
γj, j 6= i. Indeed, when the risk aversion of the i−th market maker increases, Z?,S,i decreases. When
the risk aversions of the N − 1 other market makers increase, Z?,S,i increases and conversely.
4.4.4 On the taker cost policy
When the i−th market maker is simultaneously best bid and best ask, the exchange can fix a relevant
value of the taker cost c as in [4]. From numerical computations
u(t, q)2
u(t, q ⊕i 1)u(t, q 	i 1) ≈ 1, for all (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× Z
N .
Hence the exchange may fix in practice the transaction cost c so that the average best spread is close
to one tick by setting
c ≈ − 12NTick−
1
ηN
log
(
k$
k$ + ση
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
))
+ 1
γiN
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)
.
When ση/k$, and σγi/k$ are small enough for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, this equation reduces to
c ≈ 1
N
(
σ
k$
− 12Tick
)
.
We therefore find a similar formula to the one in the case N = 1, and notice that it is a decreasing
function of the number of market makers, with $ = 1
N
. As σ and k can be estimated in practice using
market data, this is a particularly useful rule of thumb to determine the taker cost c. However, when
one market maker is the best bid and another one is the best ask, the approximation u(t,q)2
u(t,q⊕i1)u(t,q	i1) ≈ 1
is no longer valid. Hence, the exchange has the choice either to stay with the previous rule of thumb,
or to monitor a time-dependent taker cost given by
c(t, q)≈− 12NTick−
1
ηN
(
log
(
u(t, q)2
u(t,q	i1)u(t,q⊕j1)
)
+log
(
k$
k$+ση
(
1+ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$+σγi
)))
+ 1
γiN
log
(
1+σγi
k$
)
.
where the i−th agent is the best ask, and the j−th is the best bid.
5 Impact of the presence of several market makers
In this section, we compare our results with the ones given in [4].
5.1 One market maker
As a sanity check, we want to recover the results of [4]. We take the same numerical values for
the parameters, namely T = 600s for an asset with volatility σ = 0.3 Tick.s−1/2 (unless specified
differently). Market orders arrive according to the intensities described in Section 2, with A = 1.5s−1
and k = 0.3s−1/2. We have q = 50, γ = 0.01, η = 1, c = 0.5Tick and $ = 1. We directly present the
results of our model
We see in Figures 1 to 5 that we recover the results obtained in [4]. We now turn to the case N ≥ 2.
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Figure 1: Total spread for 1 market maker Figure 2: Ask order flow for 1 market maker
Figure 3: Total order flow for 1 market maker Figure 4: PnL of the exchange for 1 marketmaker
Figure 5: Trading cost for 1 market maker
5.2 Two market makers
We first begin with the average spread in the case N = 2, with $ = 12 . The brackets in the title of the
figures denote the set of risk aversion of the agents.
We can see in Figures 6, 7 and 8 an increase of the total spread compared to the case N = 1. As
explained in Section 4.4, this is due to the fact that the quantities z?j, j = a, b are decreasing function
of N . Hence the incentive given to each market maker is less important than in the case N = 1.
In addition to this, adding a market maker with a higher risk aversion decrease the total spread and
conversely.
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Figure 6: Total spread for N = 2, [0.01, 0.001] Figure 7: Total spread for N = 2, [0.01, 0.01]
Figure 8: Total spread for N = 2, [0.01, 0.1]
Such spread induces a decrease of total order flow, see Figure 9, compared to the case N = 1. For sake
of simplicity we only present the results for two market makers with same risk aversion.
Figure 9: Total order flow forN = 2, [0.01, 0.01] Figure 10: Ask order flow for N = 2, [0.01, 0.01]
Similar results occurs for different risk aversion parameters, except that the decrease of order flow is
less important with a second market maker with a higher risk aversion parameter and conversely. This
also has an impact on the trading cost and the PnL of the platform, as it can be seen in Figures 11,12.
We can see in Figure 12 an increase of the trading cost due to a mixed effect of the decrease of order flow,
and an increase of the total spread, see Figures 6,7 and 9. However, we see an increase in the PnL of the
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Figure 11: PnL of the exchange for N = 2,
[0.01, 0.01] Figure 12: Trading cost for N = 2, [0.01, 0.01]
exchange, mainly due to the fact that the reservation utility for every agent yˆi0 := k$σ log
(
u(0, Q0)
)
i ∈
{1, . . . , N} is less important than in the case N = 1.
5.3 Five market makers
This case aims at illustrating what happens when we increase again the number of market makers. For
sake of simplicity we only illustrate the case of market makers having the same risk aversion parameter
equal to 0.01.
Figure 13: Total spread for N = 5 Figure 14: Total order flow for N = 5
As expected, we obtain in Figure 13 a higher total spread, which implies a decrease of the order flow,
see Figure 14. However, in Figure 16, the PnL of the platform has decreased compared to the case
N = 2. This means that it is not optimal for the platform to attract an infinite number of market
makers. We conclude these numerical experiments with Figure 18 showing how the PnL of the platform
evolve with the number of market makers. We emphasise here that what is important is not the risk
aversion of the market makers added to the market: this has an impact on the PnL of the platform
but not on the trend of the graph. Hence, we add market makers with the same risk aversion equals
to 0.01.
In Figure 18, there are two different plots. The orange one is with $ = 1
N
and c the taker cost being
fixed. The red one is with $ = 1
N
and c = 1
N
(
σ
k
− 12Tick
)
as stated in the previous section. We can see
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Figure 15: Ask order flow for N = 5 Figure 16: PnL of the exchange for N = 5
Figure 17: Trading cost for N = 5 Figure 18: Evolution of the PnL of the platformwith the number of market makers
that without an optimal taker cost policy, the optimal number of market makers for the platform is at
N = 2, other parameters being fixed. However, with an optimal policy, the platform is encouraged to
add another market maker to increase its PnL. It is also worth noting that in both cases, the platform
can add up to 4 market makers and still have a PnL higher than in the case N = 1.
A Appendix
A.1 Dynamic programming principle
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, any F−stopping times τ taking values in [0, T ], any admissible contract vector
ξ ∈ C, any 2(N − 1)−dimensional F−predictable process δ−i, bounded by δ∞, and for all δ ∈ Ai(δ−i),
we define
J i(ξi, τ, δ, δ−i) := Eδ⊗iδ−iτ
[
− exp
(
− γi
∫ T
τ
δau1{δau=δau⊗iδa,−iu }dN
a
u + δbu1{δbu=δbu⊗iδb,−iu }dN
b
u +QiudSu
+
K∑
`=1
ω`
(
δau1{δau∈K`}dN
a
u + δbu1{δbu∈K`}dN
b
u
))
exp
(
− γiξi
).
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We also define the family J iτ := (J i(ξi, τ, δ, δ−i))δ∈Ai(δ−i). The continuation utility of the i−th market
maker is defined by
V iτ (ξi, δ−i) = ess sup
δ∈Ai(δ−i)
J i(ξi, τ, δ, δ−i). (A.1)
Lemma A.1. Let τ be a stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then, there exists a non–decreasing
sequence (δn)n∈N in Ai(δ−i) such that V iτ (ξi, δ−i) = limn→+∞ J i(ξi, τ, δn, δ−i).
Proof. For (δ, δ′) ∈ Ai(δ−i)×Ai(δ−i), we define
δ := δ1{JiT (ξi,τ,δ,δ−i)≥JiT (ξi,τ,δ′,δ−i)} + δ
′1{JiT (ξi,τ,δ,δ−i)≤JiT (ξi,τ,δ′,δ−i)}.
We have δ ∈ Ai(δ−i) and by definition of δ, J i(ξi, τ, δ, δ−i) ≥ max
(
J i(ξi, τ, δ, δ−i), J i(ξi, τ, δ′, δ−i)
)
.
Hence, J iτ is upward directed, and the required result follows from [16, Proposition VI.I.I p121].
Lemma A.2. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be an F−stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then
V it (ξi, δ−i) = ess sup
δi∈Ai(δ−i)
Eδi⊗iδ−it
[
− exp
(
−γi
∫ τ
t
δa,iu 1{δi,au =δau⊗iδa,−iu }dN
a
u+δi,bu 1{δi,bu =δbu⊗iδb,−iu }dN
b
u+QiudSu
+
K∑
`=1
ω`
(
δi,au 1{δi,au ∈K`}dN
a
u + δi,bu 1{δi,bu ∈K`}dN
b
u
))
V iτ (ξi, δ−i)
]
.
Proof. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and fix an F−stopping time τ with values in [t, T ]. To simplify the notations, we
define for all t ∈ [0, T ] and δ ∈ A
Dit,T (δ) := e
−γi
∫ T
t
δa,iu 1{δi,au =δau}
dNau+δ
i,b
u 1{δi,bu =δbu}
dNbu+QiudSu+
∑K
`=1 ω`(δ
i,a
u 1{δi,au ∈K`}
dNau+δ
i,b
u 1{δi,bu ∈K`}
dNbu)
.
First, by the tower property, we have that
V it (ξi, δ−i) = ess sup
δi∈Ai(δ−i)
Eδi⊗iδ−it
[
−Dit,τ (δ)Eδ
i⊗iδ−i
τ
[
Diτ,T (δ) exp
(
− γiξi
)]]
.
For all δ ∈ A, the quotient LδT
Lδτ
does not depend on the value of δ before time τ . This is by definition
of the integrals. Then
Eδi⊗iδ−iτ
[
Diτ,T (δ) exp
(
− γiξi
)]
= E0τ
[
− L
δi⊗iδ−i
T
Lδi⊗iδ−iτ
Diτ,T (δ) exp
(
− γiξi
)]
≤ ess sup
δi∈Ai(δ−i)
Eδi⊗iδ−iτ
[
−Diτ,T (δ) exp
(
− γiξi
)]
= V iτ (ξi, δ−i).
Hence, we obtain that
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≤ ess sup
δi∈Ai(δ−i)
Eδi⊗iδ−it
[
− V iτ (ξi, δ−i)Dit,τ (δ)
]
.
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We next prove the reverse inequality. Let δi ∈ Ai(δ−i) and δ′i ∈ Ai(δ−i). We define
(δi ⊗τ δ′i)u := δiu1{0≤u≤τ} + δ
′i
u1{τ<u≤T}. (A.2)
Then, δi ⊗τ δ′i being predictable as a sum of two predictable processes, δi ⊗τ δ′i ∈ Ai(δ−i) and
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≥ E(δ
i⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
t
[
−Diτ,T (δ′)Dit,τ (δ) exp
(
− γiξi
)]
= E(δ
i⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
t
[
E(δi⊗τ δ
′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
[
−Diτ,T (δ′) exp(−γiξi)
]
Dit,τ (δ)
]
.
Using Bayes formula, and noting that L
(δi⊗τ δ
′i)⊗iδ−i
T
L
(δi⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
= L
δ
′i⊗iδ−i
T
L
δ
′i⊗iδ−i
τ
, we have
E(δi⊗τ δ
′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
[
−Diτ,T (δ′) exp
(
− γiξi
)]
= E0τ
[
− L
δ
′i⊗iδ−i
T
Lδ
′i⊗iδ−i
τ
Diτ,T (δ′) exp(−γiξi)
]
= J iT (ξi, τ, δ
′i, δ−i).
We therefore have
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≥ E(δ
i⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
t
[
Dit,τ (δ)J iT (ξi, τ, δ
′i, δ−i)
]
.
We can therefore use Bayes’s formula and the fact that L
(δi⊗τ δ
′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
L
(δi⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
t
= L
δi⊗iδ−i
τ
L
δi⊗iδ−i
t
to finally obtain
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≥ = E0t
E0τ
[
L
(δi⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
T
L
(δi⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
L(δ
i⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
τ
L
(δi⊗τ δ′i)⊗iδ−i
t
Dit,τ (δ)J iT (ξi, τ, δ
′i, δ−i)
]
= Eδi⊗iδ−it
[
Dit,τ (δ)J iT (ξi, τ, δ
′i, δ−i)
]
.
Since the previous inequality holds for all δ′i ∈ Ai(δ−i) we deduce from the monotone convergence
theorem together with Lemma A.1 that there exists a sequence (δ′n)n∈N of controls in Ai(δ−i) such
that
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≥ limn→+∞E
δi⊗iδ−i
t
[
Dit,τ (δ)J iT (ξi, τ, δ
′n, δ−i)
]
= Eδi⊗iδ−it
[
Dit,τ (δ)V iτ (ξi, δ−i)
]
,
thus concluding the proof.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
We begin with a lemma concerning the integrability of the continuation utility of the i−th agent defined
in (A.1).
Lemma A.3. For all δ ∈ A and all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the process V i(ξi, δ−i) is negative, and uniformly
integrable under Pδ. Moreover, the process Dis,t(δ) is uniformly integrable under Pδ, for all δ ∈ A, (s, t) ∈
[0, T ]2, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
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Proof. Let  > 0, and δ ∈ A. Thanks to the uniform boundedness of δi ∈ Ai(δ−i), we have that
Lδ
i⊗iδ−i
T
Lδ
i⊗iδ−i
t
≥ αt,T := e− kσ (c+δ∞(1+H))(NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )−2Ae−
kc
σ (e
k
σ (δ∞(1+H))+1)(T−t) ≥ α0,T , (A.3)
with H := max`=1,...,K H`. Therefore,
V it (ξi, δ−i) ≤ E0t
[
− αt,T e−γi(2δ∞(NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )+
∫ T
t
QiudSu)e−γiξi
]
< 0.
By Jensen’s inequality, we have
Eδi⊗iδ−i
[(
V it (ξi, δ−i)
)1+] ≤ E0[α0,TE0t [(−αt,T )1+e−γ′i (2δ∞(NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )+∫ Tt QiudSu)e−γ′iξi]
]
,
where γ′i := γi(1 + ). Thanks to Hölder’s inequality, together with the boundedness of the intensities
of the point processes N i,j, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and j ∈ {a, b}, and Condition (2.8), the right–hand side
is bounded from above by a term independent of t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, the continuation utility function of
the market makers is Pδ−uniformly integrable.
Moreover, we have
Eδ
[
(Dis,t(δ))1+
]
= Eδ
[
e−γ
′
i
∫ T
t
δa,iu 1{δi,au =δau}
dNau+δ
i,b
u 1{δi,bu =δbu}
dNbu+QiudSu+
∑K
`=1 ω`(δ
i,a
u 1{δi,au ∈K`}
dNau+δ
i,b
u 1{δi,bu ∈K`}
dNbu)
]
≤ Eδ
[
eγ
′
iδ∞(1+Kω1)(Nat −Nas +Nbt−Nbs )+
∫ t
s
QiudSu
]
< +∞
using boundedness of the intensities of the point process and the inventory process Qi, for i ∈
{1, . . . , N}. The conclusion follows using Hölder’s inequality, and the fact that N iT ≥ N it − N is for
i ∈ {a, b}.
We introduce for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and all δ ∈ Ai(δ−i) the process
U δ⊗iδ
−i
t := V it (ξi, δ−i)Di0,t(δi ⊗i δ−i), t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 1: Let ξ ∈ C be an admissible contract. By definition, there is a Nash equilibrium δˆ(ξ) ∈ A. By
use of the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.2, for all δi ∈ Ai(δˆ−i(ξ)), the process U δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
defines a Pδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)−supermartingale. We now check that the process U δˆ(ξ) is a uniformly integrable
Pδˆ(ξ)−martingale.
By Definition 2.6, the control δˆi(ξ) is optimal for the i−th market maker in the sense that
V iMM
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
=Eδˆ(ξ)
[
Ui
(
ξi+
∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ T
0
δˆi,jt (ξ)
(
1{δˆi,jt (ξ)=δˆjt (ξ)}+
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`1{δˆi,jt (ξ)∈K`}
)
dN jt +
∫ T
0
QitdSt
)]
.
Hence, an application of the supermartingale property leads, for any stopping time τ taking values in
[0, T ], to
V iMM
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
≥ Eδˆ(ξ)
[
Di0,τ
(
δˆ(ξ)
)
V iτ
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)]
≥ Eδˆ(ξ)
[
Ui
(
ξi+
∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ T
0
δˆi,jt (ξ)
(
1{δˆi,jt (ξ)=δˆjt (ξ)}+
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`1{δˆi,jt (ξ)∈K`}
)
dN jt +
∫ T
0
QitdSt
)]
= V iMM
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
.
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All these inequalities are thus equalities, which proves, since the filtration is right–continuous, that
(U δˆ(ξ)t )t∈[0,T ] is a Pδˆ(ξ)−martingale, and thus for any t ∈ [0, T ]
U
δˆ(ξ)
t = E
δˆ(ξ)
t
[
Ui
(
ξi +
∑
j∈{a,b}
∫ T
0
δˆi,jt (ξ)
(
1{δˆi,jt (ξ)=δˆjt (ξ)} +
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`1{δˆi,jt (ξ)∈K`}
)
dN jt +
∫ T
0
QitdSt
)]
.
Using Lemma A.3, we conclude that U δˆ(ξ) is a uniformly integrable Pδˆ(ξ)−martingale. Since the filtration
F is right–continuous, we deduce that U δˆ(ξ) has a càdlàg Pδˆ(ξ)−modification. Since all probability
measures here are equivalent, we can assume that U δˆ(ξ) actually has càdlàg paths. As all the probability
measures indexed by δ ∈ A are equivalent, we deduce that (U δt )t∈[0,T ] admits a càdlàg modification, for
all δ ∈ A.
Given the above, for any δi ∈ Ai(δˆ−i(ξ)), we can apply Doob–Meyer’s decomposition to the Pδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
supermartingale U δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ) to obtain
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t = M
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t − Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),c
t − Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
where M δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ) is a uniformly integrable Pδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)−martingale and
A
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t = A
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),c
t + A
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
is an integrable non–decreasing predictable process such that Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),c
0 = A
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
0 = 0, with
pathwise continuous component Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),c and a piecewise constant predictable process Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d.
Moreover, using the martingale representation theorem under Pδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),see [4, Section A.1], there exist
predictable processes
Z˜δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ) = (Z˜δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),S, Z˜δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,a, Z˜δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,b), j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
such that
M
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t = V i0 +
∫ t
0
Z˜δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),S
r dSr +
N∑
j=1
Z˜δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,a
r dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,a
r + Z˜δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,b
r dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,b
r .
where the processes N˜ δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,a, N˜ δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,b, are defined by (2.4).
Let Y i
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
be defined by V i
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
= −e−γiY i(ξi,δˆ−i(ξ)). Since Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d is a predictable
point process and the jump times of (N i,a, N i,b) are totally inaccessible stopping times under P0, we
have
〈
N i,a, Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
〉
=
〈
N i,b, Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
〉
= 0, a.s. Using Ito¯’s formula, we obtain that
Y iT
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
= ξi, and dY it
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
=
N∑
j=1
Zi,j,at dN j,at + Zi,j,bt dN j,bt + ZS,it dSt − dI it − dA˜i,dt , (A.4)
where by direct identification of the coefficients
Zi,j,at := −
1
γi
log
(
1 + Z˜
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,a
t
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t−
)
− δi,at 1{δi,at =δat ⊗iδˆa,−it (ξ)} −
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,a
t 1{δi,at ∈K`},
Zi,j,bt := −
1
γi
log
(
1 + Z˜
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),i,j,b
t
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t−
)
− δi,bt 1{δi,bt =δbt⊗iδˆb,−it (ξ)} −
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,b
t 1{δi,bt ∈K`},
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ZS,it := −
Z˜
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),S
t
γiU
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t−
−Qit− , I it :=
∫ t
0
(
h
i(δir, δˆ−ir (ξ), Zir, Qr)dr −
1
γiU
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
r
dAδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),cr
)
,
h
i(δit, δˆ−it (ξ), Zit , Qt) := h(δit, δˆ−it (ξ), Zit , Qt)−
1
2γiσ
2
(
ZS,it
)2
, A˜i,dt :=
1
γi
∑
s≤t
log
(
1− ∆A
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
t
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t−
)
.
In particular, the last relation between A˜i,d and Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d shows that the process
∆ait :=−∆Aδ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d
t /U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t− ≥0
is independent of δi ∈ Ai(δˆ−i(ξ)).
We now prove that, Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d=−∑0<s≤·U δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)s− ∆ais = 0 so that
A˜i,d=0, It=
∫ ·
0
H
i(δˆ−i(ξ), Zir, Qr)dr,
where
H
i(δˆ−i(ξ), Zit , Qt) = H i(δˆ−i(ξ), Zit , Qt)−
1
2γiσ
2(ZS,it )2.
As V iT
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
= −1, note that
0 = sup
δi∈Ai(δˆ−i(ξ))
Eδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
[
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
T
]
− V i0 (ξi, δ−i)
= sup
δi∈Ai(δˆ−i(ξ))
Eδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
[
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
T −M δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
T
]
= γi sup
δi∈Ai(δˆ−i(ξ))
E0
[
L
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
T
∫ T
0
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
r−
(
dI ir − hi(δir, δˆ−ir (ξ), Zir, Qr)dr +
dair
γi
)]
.
Moreover, since the controls are uniformly bounded, we have by Lemma A.3
U
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t ≤ −βit = V it
(
ξi, δˆ−i(ξ)
)
e−2δ∞(NaT−Na0 +NbT−Nb0)−γi
∫ t
0 Q
i
rdSr < 0.
Since Aδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),d ≥ 0, U δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ) ≤ 0, and dI it − hi(δit, δˆ−it (ξ), Zit , Qt)dt ≥ 0, we obtain
0 ≤ sup
δi∈Ai(δˆ−i(ξ))
E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
−βir−
(
dI ir − hi(δir, δˆ−ir (ξ), Zir, Qr)dr +
dair
γi
)]
= −E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
βir−
(
dI ir −H i(δˆ−ir (ξ), Zir, Qr)dr +
dair
γi
)]
.
The quantities α0,T
∫ T
0 β
i
r−
(
dI ir −H i(δˆ−ir (ξ), Zir, Qr)
)
dr and α0,T
∫ T
0 β
i
r−
dair
γi
being non–negative random
variables, this implies the announced result.
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Given the dynamic under Pδˆ(ξ) of the process U δˆ(ξ)t , Ito¯’s formula leads to
dU δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t =
N∑
j=1
Z˜
δˆ(ξ),i,j,a
t dN˜
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,a
t + Z˜
δˆ(ξ),i,j,b
t dN˜
δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ),j,b
t + Z˜
δˆ(ξ),i,S
t dSt
+ U δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
t
(
h
(
δˆt(ξ), δˆ−it (ξ), Z
δˆ(ξ),i
t , Qt
)
− h
(
δit, δˆ
−i
t (ξ), Z
δˆ(ξ),i
t , Qt
))
dt
and the Pδi⊗iδ∗−i−supermartingale property implies that, almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ]
h
(
δˆit(ξ), δˆ−i(ξ), Z
δˆ(ξ),i
t , Qt
)
− h
(
δit, δˆ
−i
t (ξ), Z
δˆ(ξ),i
t , Qt
)
≥ 0.
Hence
δˆit(ξ) ∈ argmax
δ∈B2∞
h
(
δ, δˆ−it (ξ), Z˜
δˆ(ξ),i
t , Qt
)
.
Finally, we check that Z ∈ Z. Using Lemma A.3, we have that
sup
δi∈Ai(δˆ−i(ξ))
Eδi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
[
|U δi⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)T |p
′+1
]
< +∞
for some p′ > 0. The desired conclusion comes from the fact that
e−γiY iT = U δ
i⊗iδˆ−i(ξ)
T D0,T
(
δi ⊗i δˆ−i(ξ)
)
.
Remark A.4. Note that we described here a solution to the following system of N BSDEs given by,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
Y i,y0,Z,δˆt := ξi−
N∑
j=1
∫ T
t
Zi,j,ar dN j,ar +Zi,j,br dN j,br +ZS,ir dSr+
(
1
2γiσ
2(ZS,ir +Qir)2 −H i(δˆ−i(ξ), Zir, Qir)
)
dr.
Step 2: Conversely, let us be given a contract vector ξ = Y y0,Z,δˆT ∈ Ξ, with (Y0, Z) ∈ RN × Z and
δˆ ∈ O. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we note
V it
(
Y i,y0,Z,δˆT , δˆ
−i(Y y0,Z,δˆT )
)
:= −e−γiY i,y0,Z,δˆt .
Given an arbitrary bid–ask policy δi ∈ Ai(δˆ−i) of the i−th agent, an application of Ito¯’s formula leads
to
dU δi⊗iδˆ−it = − γiU δ
i⊗iδˆ−i
t
(
(Qit + Z
S,i
t )dSt − (H i(δˆ−it , Zit , Qt)− hi(δit, δˆ−it , Zit , Qt))dt
+ γ−1i
(
1− exp
(
− γi
(
Zi,at + δi,at 1{δi,at =δat ⊗iδˆa,−it } +
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,a
t 1{δi,at ∈K`}
)))
dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i,a
t
+ γ−1i
(
1− exp
(
− γi
(
Zi,bt + δi,bt 1{δi,bt =δbt⊗iδˆb,−it } +
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,b
t 1{δi,bt ∈K`}
)))
dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i,b
t
)
.
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Hence,
(
U δ
i⊗iδˆ−i
t
)
t∈[0,T ] is a P
δi⊗iδˆ−i−local supermartingale. Thanks to Lemma A.3, U δi⊗iδˆ−it is Pδi⊗iδˆ−i
uniformly integrable and is a true supermartingale. Hence, we obtain that
−
∫ ·
0
γiU
δi⊗iδˆ−i
t
(
(Qit + Z
S,i
t )dSt
+ γ−1i
(
1− exp
(
− γi(Zi,at + δi,at 1{δi,at =δat ⊗iδˆa,−it } +
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,a
t 1{δi,at ∈K`})
))
dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i,a
t
+ γ−1i
(
1− exp
(
− γi(Zi,bt + δi,bt 1{δi,bt =δbt⊗iδˆb,−it } +
K∑
`=1
∫ T
0
ω`δ
i,b
t 1{δi,bt ∈K`})
))
dN˜ δ
i⊗iδˆ−i,b
t
)
is a true martingale. Therefore
J iMM(ξi, δi, δˆ−i) = Eδ
i⊗iδ−i
[
U δ
i⊗iδˆ−i
T
]
= −e−γiyi0 + Eδi⊗iδ−i
[ ∫ T
0
γiU
δi⊗iδˆ−i
t
(
H i(δˆ−it , Zit , Qt)− hi(δit, δˆ−it , Zit , Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ −e−γiyi0 .
In addition to this, the previous inequality becomes an equality if and only if δi is chosen as the
maximiser of the Hamiltonian hi. By definition, it means that U δˆ is a Pδˆ−martingale and that δˆi is the
optimal control for the i−th agent, in the sense of (2.6). As this property holds for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
it means that δˆ is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally as we showed that the contracts in Ξ generates at least one Nash equilibrium we have the
inclusion C ⊃ Ξ. Hence, the equality Ξ = C is proved.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.8
For (z, q) ∈ RN × ZN , we set zi,`,j = zi,j for all (i, `) ∈ {1, . . . , N}2 and j ∈ {a, b}. Hence, the
Hamiltonian of the i−th agent reduces to
hi(di, d−i, zi, q) :=
∑
j∈{a,b}
γ−1i
(
1− exp
(
− γi
(
zi,j + di,j1{di,j=dj⊗idj,−i} +
K∑
k=1
ωkd
i,j1{di,j∈Kk}
)))
λj(dj, q).
For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, an optimisation of hi(di, d−i, zi, q) with respect to di leads to a unique10 maximum
defined as d?i,j(z, q) = ∆i,j(z, q) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and j ∈ {a, b}. This maximiser completely
characterise the behaviour of the i−th agent compared to the position of the N − 1 others.
Moreover, no matter if the i−th agent plays the best spread or not, compared to the response of the
other agents, his optimal response will lead to the following value
hi(∆i,:(z, q),∆−i,:(z, q), zi, q) = σ1 + σγi
k$
λj
(
∆:,j(z, q), q
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Hence, when the N agents play ∆, they have no interest in switching their bid–ask policy. Thus, it
characterises a unique fixed point of the Hamiltonian.
10Uniqueness follows from strict concavity of the vector hi with respect to d ∈ B2N∞
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A.4 Exchange’s Hamiltonian maximisation
The following technical result follows from direct but tedious computations. It provides condition on
δ∞ under which the maximisers defined in (4.2) exist.
Lemma A.5. Let q ∈ QN , c ∈ R, (η, k, σ) ∈ (0,+∞)3, γi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and v0, . . . , vN <
0. Then, for z ∈ RN and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, j ∈ {a, b}, we define
Φi,jq (z) := λi,j
(
∆:,j(z, q), q
)(
eη(Nzj−c)vi − v0Lj
(
∆(z, q)
)))
, Φjq(z) :=
N∑
i=1
Φi,jq (z),
with ∆(z, q) defined as in Lemma 3.9, and δ∞ > 0. Assume that
δ∞ ≥ C∞ + N
η
∣∣∣∣∣log
(
v0∑N
i=1 vi
)∣∣∣∣∣,
with C∞ := N |c| + ∑Ni=1
((
1
η
+ 1
γi
)
log
(
1 + σγi
k$
))
− N
η
log
(
k$
k$+ση
(
1 + ησ∑Ni=1 1k$+σγi)
)
. Then, the
functions Φjq, j ∈ {a, b}, admit a maximum z? given by
z? := 1
N
c+ 1
η
log
(
v0∑
i∈G vi
)
+ 1
η
log
(
k$
k$ + σηCard(G)
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
)).
Moreover
Φjq(z?) = −Cv0 exp
(
k$
ση
log
(
v0∑
i∈G vi
))
,
where
C := A exp
(
− k
σ
(
c
(
1−$
)
− $
η
log
(
k$
k$ + ησCard(G)
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
))
+$
N∑
i=1
γ−1i log
(
1 + σγi
k$
)))
× ση
k$ + ση
(
1 + ησ
N∑
i=1
1
k$ + σγi
)
.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.3
As the state variables qi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} live in a discrete compact set, PDE (4.5) is in fact a system
of (2q + 1)N ordinary differential equations. Hence, a use of Cauchy–Lipschitz theorem will provide
existence and unicity. We define
S := {x ∈ R : lb < x < ub < 0, (lb, ub) ∈ R?2− }.
Fix some subsets I, and J of {1, . . . , N}, as well as vectors (x⊕, x	, x) ∈ RCard(I)×RCard(J)×S. Then,
we introduce for q ∈ QN , the map
Tq(x, x⊕, x	) = −xCS(q) + xC
( x∑
j∈J xi	
) k$
ση
+
(
x∑
i∈I xi⊕
) k$
ση
,
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where CS(q),and C come from (4.5). We now show that this application is Lipschitz. Direct compu-
tations show that for any (i, j) ∈ I × J
∂xTq = −CS(q) +
(
1 + k$
ση
)
C
((
x∑
j∈J x
j
	
) k$
ση
+
(
x∑
i∈I xi⊕
) k$
ση
)
,
∂xi⊕Tq = −
k$
ση
C
(
x∑
i∈I xi⊕
)1+ k$
ση
, ∂xj	
Tq = −k$
ση
C
(
x∑
j∈J x
j
	
)1+ k$
ση
.
By the fact that (x, x⊕, x	) ∈ S × S#I × S#J , the gradient of Tq is uniformly bounded (in the ‖ · ‖∞
sense).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4.4
We begin this section with a technical lemma.
Lemma A.6. Let Z ∈ Z, and define ξ := Y 0,Z,∆(Z,Q)T . We define
KZt := exp
(
− η
(
c(Nat +N bt )− Y 0,Z,∆t · 1N
))
, t ∈ [0, T ].
There exists C > 0, and  > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |1+
]
≤ C.
Proof. Let p > 1. By using Hölder’s inequality and the uniform boundedness of the intensities of Na,
and N b, there exists C ′ > 0 such that
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |p
]
≤ C ′
N∏
i=1
E0
[(
e−γiY
i,0,Z,∆
t
)− p′iη
γi
] p
p′
i
for any p′i > p, and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Hence
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |p
]
≤ C ′
N∏
i=1
(
1 + E0
[(
− e−γiY i,0,Z,∆t
)− p′iη
γi
])
= C ′
N∏
i=1
1+E0
(−esssup
δi∈Ai(∆−i)
Eδi⊗i∆−it
[
exp
(
−γi
(
Y i,0,Z,∆T +PLδ
i⊗i∆−i
T −PLδ
i⊗i∆−i
t
))])− p′iηγi .
From Jensen’s and Holder’s inequality, we have that for any p′′i > p′i, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |p
]
≤ C ′
N∏
i=1
1 + E0[( esssup
δi∈Ai(∆−i)
Eδi⊗i∆−it
[
ep
′
iη(Y
i,0,Z,∆
T +PL
δi
T −PLδ
i
t )
])]
≤ C ′
N∏
i=1
1 + E0[ esssup
δi∈Ai(∆−i)
Eδi⊗i∆−it
[
ep
′′
i ηY
i,0,Z,∆
T
]].
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By using a dynamic programming principle, similar to Lemma A.2, for any F stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ],
and noting that the family
J (τ, δi, δ−i) :=
(
Eδi⊗i∆−iτ
[
ep′′i ηY
i,0,Z,∆
T
])
δi∈Ai(∆−i)
is upward directed, we get
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |p
]
≤ C ′
N∏
i=1
(
1 + Eδi⊗iδ−i
[
ep′′i ηY
i,0,Z,∆
T
])
.
By setting ε := η′−η3 , where η
′ comes from (2.10), we can take p = 1 + ε, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
p′i = p+ ε, p′′i = p′i + ε. We obtain
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |1+
]
≤ C′
N∏
i=1
(
1 + Eδi⊗i∆−i
[
eη′Y
i,0,Z,∆
T
])
By definition of Z, we get for any t ∈ [0, T ]
E∆(Z,Q)
[
|KZt |1+
]
≤ C,
where C := C ′∏Ni=1
(
1 + Eδi⊗i∆−i
[
eη
′
Y i,0,Z,∆T
])
< +∞.
To prove Theorem 4.4, we verify that the function v introduced in (4.4) coincides at
(
0, Q0
)
with the
value function of the reduced exchange problem with maximum achieved at the optimum z∗(t, Qt) in
(4.2).
The function v is negative bounded Moreover, since δ∞ ≥ ∆∞, it follows that v is a solution of (4.4).
A direct application of Ito¯’s formula coupled with substitution of (4.4) leads to
d(v(t, Qt)KZt )
KZt−
=
(
hZt −Ht
)
dt+η
N∑
i=1
(
v
(
t, Qt
)
ZS,it dSt+
∑
j∈{a,b}
(
v
(
t, Qit−+φ(j)
)
eη(NZj−c)− v
(
t, Qt−
))
dN˜∆,i,jt
)
,
(A.5)
where
Ht := H
(
Qt,V+(t, q),V−(t, q), v
(
t, Qt
))
= sup
Z∈Z
hZt .
By the fact that v is bounded and
(
KZt
)
t∈[0,T ] is P
δ−uniformly integrable under all δ ∈ A, the process(
v
(
t, Qt
)
KZt
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a P∆(Z,Q)−supermartingale and the local martingale term in (A.5) is a true
martingale. Hence
v(0, Q0) = E∆(Z,Q)
[
v(T,QT )KZT +
∫ T
0
KZt (Ht − ht)dt
]
≥ E∆(Z,Q)
[
v(T,QT )KZT
]
= E∆(Z,Q)
[
−KZT
]
,
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by the boundary condition v(T, ·) = −1. By arbitrariness of Z ∈ Z, this provides the inequality
v(0, Q0) ≥ sup
Z∈Z
E∆(Z,Q)[−KZT ] = vE0 .
On the other hand, consider the maximiser Z?
(
t, Qt−
)
in (4.2). As (Z?)t∈[0,T ] is a bounded process,
integrability conditions (2.8) and (2.10) are satisfied. Hence, Z? ∈ Z. By definition,
hZ
? −H = 0,
thus leading to
v(0, Q0) = E∆(Z
?,Q)
[
−KZ?T
]
.
Hence, v(0, Q0) = vE0 , with optimal control Z?.
A.7 First–best exchange problem
In this section, we consider the case of the first best problem. In this particular setting, the principal
can control both the spreads quoted by the agents and the contracts given to them. Hence, the exchange
manages all the control processes. The goal of this section is to show that the first best problem differs
from the second best that we solved throughout this paper. We first introduce the Lagrange multipliers
λ := (λi)i=1,...,N associated to the participation constraints of the agents. For any finite dimensional
vector space E, with given norm ‖ ·‖E, we also introduce the so–called Morse–Transue space on a given
probability space (Ω,F ,P), defined by
Mφ(E) :=
{
ξ : Ω −→ E measurable, E[φ(aξ)] < +∞, for any a ≥ 0
}
,
where φ : E −→ R is the Young function, namely φ(x) = exp(‖x‖E)− 1. Then, if Mφ(E) is endowed
with the norm ‖ξ‖φ := inf{k > 0,E[φ(ξ/k)] ≤ 1} it is a (non-reflexive) Banach space.
The principal’s problem can be reformulated as
V FB0 := inf
λ>0
sup
(ξ,δ)∈C×A
Eδ
[
− e−η(c(NaT+NbT )−ξ·1N ) −
N∑
i=1
λie−γi(ξ
i+XiT+Q
i
TST ) − λiRi
]
. (A.6)
If λ and δ are fixed, we start with the maximisation with respect to ξ. We introduce the following map
Λδ : Mφ(RN)→ R defined as
Λδ(ξ) := Eδ
[
− e−η(c(NaT+NbT )−ξ·1N ) −
N∑
i=1
λie−γi(ξ
i+XiT+Q
i
TST ) − λiRi
]
The Lagrange multipliers λi being strictly positive, using the boundedness of the control process δ ∈ A,
the map Λδ is continuous, strictly concave, and Gâteaux differentiable with, for h ∈Mφ(RN)
DΛδ(ξ)[h] = Eδ
[
− ηh · 1Ne−η(c(NaT+NbT )−ξ·1N ) +
N∑
i=1
γiλih
ie−γi(ξi+XiT+QiTST )
]
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For any δ ∈ A, we define
ξ?,i(δ) := η
γi
(
c(NaT +N bT )− ξ? · 1N
)
+ 1
γi
log
(
λiγi
η
)
− (X iT +QiTST ),
ξ?(δ) · 1N = 11 + ηΓ
(
ηcΓ(NaT +N bT ) +
N∑
i=1
1
γi
log
(
λiγi
η
)
− (X iT +QiTST )
)
with Γ := ∑Ni=1 1γi . For any h ∈ Mφ(RN), first order condition gives DΛδ(ξ)[h] = 0. Computations
show that (ξ?,i)i=1,...,N achieve the maximum of Λδ(ξ), hence is optimal for (A.6). Then, substituting
these expressions in the main problem gives
V FB0 = (1 + ηΓ) inf
λ>0
N∏
i=1
(
λiγi
η
)ηγ−1i (1+ηΓ)−1
V˜0 −
N∑
i=1
λiRi, (A.7)
where
V˜0 := sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
− exp
(
− η1 + ηΓ
(
N∑
i=1
(X iT +QiTST ) + c(NaT +N bT )
))]
. (A.8)
This is a stochastic control problem, see [4, Section A.7] for details, whose HJB equation is given by∂tv(t, q) + v(t, q)
1
2σ
2Γ˜2‖q‖2 +HFB
(
q,V+(t, q),V−(t, q), v(t, q)
)
= 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T )×QN ,
v(T, q) = −1, q ∈ QN ,
(A.9)
where Γ˜ := η1+ηΓ , and
HFB
(
q,V+(t, q),V−(t, q), v(t, q)
)
:= HFB,b
(
q,V+(t, q), v(t, q)
)
+HFB,a
(
q,V−(t, q), v(t, q)
)
,
with, for any (p, v, j) ∈ RN × R× {a, b}
HFB,j
(
q, p, v
)
:= sup
δj∈A
N∑
i=1
λi,j(δj, q)
(
exp
(
− Γ˜
(
N∑
i=1
δi,j1{δi,j=δj} +
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
i,j1{δi,j∈K`}
))
pi − v
)
.
We are in a framework similar to [4; 8]. First order condition gives for j ∈ {a, b}
N∑
i=1
δ?,j,i1{δ?,j,i=δ?,j,i}+
K∑
`=1
ω`δ
?,j,i1{δ?,j,i∈K`}=Pj(t, q) :=
1
Γ˜
log(1+ Γ˜σ
kω
)
+log
(∑
i∈G v(t, q 	i φ(j))
v(t, q)
).
Such conditions are satisfied with the following optimal bid–ask policy, for j ∈ {a, b}
δ?,j,i(t, q) :=
(−δ∞) ∨
1
ω`
Pj(t, q) ∧ δ∞, if 1
ω`
Pa(t, q) ∈ K`, for ` ∈ {1, . . . , K},
(−δ∞) ∨ Pj(t, q) ∧ δ∞, otherwise.
Finally, computations show that the Hessian associated to the supremum in δ?,j is symmetric definite
negative, hence, δ? is a local maximum.
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Theorem A.7. There exists a unique negative bounded solution to the PDE∂tv(t, q)+v(t, q)
(
σ2
2 Γ˜
2‖q‖2−C˜FB
((
v(t, q)∑
i∈G v(t, q ⊕i 1)
) k$
σΓ˜
+
(
v(t, q)∑
i∈G v(t, q 	i 1)
) k$
σΓ˜
))
= 0, ,
v(T, q) = −1,
with (t, q) ∈ [0, T )×QN , C˜FB := A exp
(
− k$
σΓ˜ log
(
1 + Γ˜σ
k$
))
Γ˜σ
k$+Γ˜σ . Moreover, this solution coincides
with the value function of the exchange for the problem (A.6).
The proof is omitted as it relies on the same basis arguments as Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.4.
We now prove that the PDE satisfied by the value function of the First Best problem is different from
the one verified in the second best case (4.5). Taking the special case γi := γ, i.e the case of market
makers with same risk aversion, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the PDE boils boils down to
∂tv(t, q) + v(t, q)CFB(q)− v(t, q)C˜FB
∑
j∈{a,b}
(
v(t, q)∑N
i=1 1{φ(j)qi>−q}v(t, qi − φ(j))
) k$
ση
= 0, ,
v(T, q) = −1, ,
where (t, q)∈ [0, T )×QN and
CFB(q) := 12σ
2Γ˜2‖q‖2.
By noting that for all q ∈ QN , CFB(q) 6= CS(q) and C 6= C˜FB, we see that the value function of the
exchange in the first best case does not coincide with the value function in the second best model.
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